

Treasury Management Update

Six Months Ended 30 September 2015

The CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) Code of Practice for Treasury Management recommends that members be updated on treasury management activities regularly (TMSS, annual and midyear reports). This report therefore ensures this Council is implementing best practice in accordance with the Code.

1. Economic Background

- UK GDP growth rates in 2013 of 2.2% and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again, possibly being equal to that of the US. However, quarter 1 of 2015 was weak at +0.4% (+2.9% y/y) though there was a rebound in quarter 2 to +0.7% (+2.4% y/y). Growth is expected to weaken marginally to about +0.5% in quarter 3 as the economy faces headwinds for exporters from the appreciation of Sterling against the Euro and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, plus the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme, although the pace of reductions was eased in the May Budget.
- Despite these headwinds, the Bank of England is forecasting growth to remain around 2.4 – 2.8% over the next three years, driven mainly by strong consumer demand as the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers has been reversed by a recovery in wage inflation at the same time that CPI inflation has fallen to, or near to, zero over the last quarter. Investment expenditure is also expected to support growth.
- The August Bank of England Inflation Report forecast was notably subdued with inflation barely getting back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. However, with the price of oil taking a fresh downward direction and Iran expected to soon rejoin the world oil market after the impending lifting of sanctions, there could be several more months of low inflation still to come, especially as world commodity prices have generally been depressed by the Chinese economic downturn.
- There are therefore considerable risks around whether inflation will rise in the near future as strongly as previously expected; this will make it more difficult for the central banks of both the US and the UK to raise rates as soon as had previously been expected, especially given the recent major concerns around the slowdown in Chinese growth, the knock on impact on the earnings of emerging countries from falling oil and commodity prices, and the volatility we have seen in equity and bond markets in 2015 so far, which could potentially spill over to impact the real economies rather than just financial markets.
- The American economy has made a strong comeback after a weak first quarter's growth at +0.6% (annualised), to grow by no less than 3.9% in

quarter 2 of 2015. While there had been confident expectations during the summer that the Fed. could start increasing rates at its meeting on 17 September, or if not by the end of 2015, the recent downbeat news about Chinese and Japanese growth and the knock on impact on emerging countries that are major suppliers of commodities, was cited as the main reason for the Fed's decision to pull back from making that start. This has led to a reappraisal of the likelihood of any increase occurring in 2015 with early 2016 now being widely regarded as being more likely.

- In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it is intended to run initially to September 2016. This already appears to have had a positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to a significant improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.0% y/y) but came in at +0.4% (+1.5% y/y) in quarter 2 and looks as if it may maintain this pace in quarter 3. However, the recent downbeat Chinese and Japanese news has raised questions as to whether the ECB will need to boost its QE programme if it is to succeed in significantly improving growth in the EZ and getting inflation up from the current level of around zero to its target of 2%.

2. Interest Rate Forecast

The Council's treasury advisor, Capita Asset Services, has provided the following forecast:

	Dec-15	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18
Bank rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%
5yr PWLB rate	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%
10yr PWLB rate	3.00%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%
25yr PWLB rate	3.60%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%
50yr PWLB rate	3.60%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%

Capita Asset Services undertook a review of its interest rate forecasts on 11 August after the August Bank of England Inflation Report. This latest forecast includes no change in the timing of the first increase in Bank Rate as being quarter 2 of 2016. With CPI inflation now likely to be at or near zero for most of 2015, it is difficult for the MPC to make a start on increasing Bank Rate when the Inflation Report forecast was also notably subdued with inflation barely getting back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. Despite average weekly earnings ticking up to 2.9% y/y in the three months ending in July, (as announced in mid-September), this is unlikely to provide ammunition for the MPC to take action to raise Bank Rate soon as labour productivity growth meant that net labour unit costs are still only rising by about 1% y/y. The significant appreciation of Sterling against the Euro in 2015 has also acted as a dampening to UK growth while sharp volatility in financial markets since the Inflation Report has depressed equity prices, raised bond prices and lowered bond yields (and PWLB rates).

The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, has repeatedly stated that increases in Bank Rate will be slow and gradual. The MPC is concerned about the impact of increases on many heavily indebted consumers, especially when average disposable income is only just starting a significant recovery as a result of recent increases in the rate of wage inflation, though some consumers will not have seen that benefit come through for them.

3. Annual Investment Strategy

The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2015/16, which includes the Annual Investment Strategy, was approved by the Council on 23 February 2015. It sets out the Council's investment priorities as being:


- Security of capital;
- Liquidity; and
- Yield

The Council will also aim to achieve the optimum return (yield) on investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short term to cover cash flow needs, but also to seek out value available in higher rates in periods up to 12 months, with highly credit rated financial institutions, using our suggested creditworthiness approach, including a minimum sovereign credit rating and Credit Default Swap (CDS) overlay information provided by Capita Asset Services.

Officers can confirm that the approved limits within the Annual Investment Strategy were not breached during the quarter ended 30 September 2015.

Investment rates available in the market have been broadly stable during the quarter and have continued at historically low levels as a result of the ultra-low Bank. The average level of funds available for investment purposes during the quarter was £13.2m. These funds were available on a temporary basis, and the level of funds available was mainly dependent on the timing of precept payments, receipt of grants and progress on the Capital Programme.

The Council's budgeted investment return for 2015/16 is £92k, and performance for the year to date is in line with budget.



4. New Borrowing


As outlined below, the general trend in PWLB rates has been an increase in interest rates during the first quarter but then a fall during the second quarter. The 50 year PWLB target (certainty) rate for new long term borrowing, for the quarter ending 30th September, fell slightly from 3.60% to 3.40% after the August Bank of England Inflation report.

No borrowing was undertaken during the quarter.

It is anticipated that further borrowing will not be undertaken during this financial year.

PWLB certainty rates for the financial year to 30 September 2015

	1 Year	5 Year	10 Year	25 Year	50 Year
Low	1.11%	1.82%	2.40%	3.06%	3.01%
Date	02/04/2015	02/04/2015	02/04/2015	02/04/2015	02/04/2015
High	1.35%	2.35%	3.06%	3.66%	3.58%
Date	05/08/2015	14/07/2015	14/07/2015	02/07/2015	14/07/2015
Average	1.26%	2.12%	2.76%	3.39%	3.29%



Borrowing in advance of need

This Council has not borrowed in advance of need during the six months ended 30 September 2015.

5. Debt Rescheduling

No debt rescheduling was undertaken during the quarter.

6. Compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits

It is a statutory duty for the Council to determine and keep under review the affordable borrowing limits. The Council's approved Treasury and Prudential Indicators are included in the approved TMSS.

During the financial year to date the Council has operated within the treasury and prudential indicators set out in the Council's Treasury Management Strategy Statement and in compliance with the Council's Treasury Management Practices. The prudential and treasury Indicators are shown in Appendix 1.

7. Other – Changes in Credit Rating Methodology

The main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) have, through much of the financial crisis, provided some institutions with a ratings "uplift" due to implied levels of sovereign support. Commencing in 2015, in response to the evolving regulatory regime, all three agencies have begun removing these "uplifts" with the timing of the process determined by regulatory progress at the national level. The process has been part of a wider reassessment of methodologies by each of the rating agencies. In addition to the removal of implied support, new methodologies are now taking into account additional factors, such as regulatory capital levels. In some cases, these factors have "netted" each other off, to leave underlying ratings either unchanged or little changed. A consequence of these new methodologies is that they have also lowered the importance of the (Fitch) Support and Viability ratings and have seen the (Moody's) Financial Strength rating withdrawn by the agency.

In keeping with the agencies' new methodologies, the credit element of our own credit assessment process now focuses solely on the Short and Long Term ratings of an institution. While this is the same process that has always been used by Standard & Poor's, this has been a change to the use of Fitch and Moody's ratings. It is important to stress that the other key elements to our process, namely the assessment of Rating Watch and Outlook information as well as the Credit Default Swap (CDS) overlay have not been changed.

It is important to stress that these rating agency changes do not reflect any changes in the underlying status or credit quality of the institution, merely a reassessment of their methodologies in light of enacted and future expected changes to the regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate. While some banks have received lower credit ratings as a result of these changes, this does not mean that they are suddenly less credit worthy than they were formerly. Rather, in the majority of cases, this mainly reflects the

fact that implied sovereign government support has effectively been withdrawn from banks. They are now expected to have sufficiently strong balance sheets to be able to withstand foreseeable adverse financial circumstances without government support. In fact, in many cases, the balance sheets of banks are now much more robust than they were before the 2008 financial crisis when they had higher ratings than now. However, this is not universally applicable, leaving some entities with modestly lower ratings than they had through much of the “support” phase of the financial crisis.